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By Democratic Audit
We have allowed the free market to hollow out our democracy
The unwinding of the post-war consensus saw a string of changes to the way states and markets interact, with
some in particular profoundly altering the balance of power between democratically elected Governments and
international capital. Bryan Gould argues that we have allowed our democratic institutions to be hollowed out,
and our societies to be transformed beyond recognition by powerful and unaccountable free market forces.
It was just over
twenty years ago, in
1989, that Francis
Fukuyama proclaimed
“the end of  history” in
his f amous essay of
that name and
proclaimed the more
or less permanent
triumph of  the West
– of  what he called
“liberal democracy”.
He argued that the
def eat of  f ascism
f our decades earlier
and the decisive
rejection of
communism signalled
nothing less than the
end-state of  human
polit ical, economic
and social development – a state so clearly the best of  all possible worlds that it was doubtf ul that anyone
could be f ound to resist or crit icise it in any serious way.
Liberal democracy, he thought, combined a polit ical organisation in which everyone had the right and
opportunity to make their voices heard, an economic organisation which – through the magic worked by the
f ree market – guaranteed to everyone at least a reasonable share of  the riches produced by an ef f icient
and responsive economy, and a social organisation in which a natural balance was struck between self -
interest and community awareness.
Today, we cannot expect an account of  the immediate f uture to be accurate in all respects when it is read
twenty-odd years later. But one of  Fukuyama’s more obvious f ailings was his reluctance to recognise that
what he described as economic liberalism was not the only f orm of  economic organisation that could
partner democratic polit ical organisation. He saw the “f ree market” and democracy as not only compatible
but as mutually supportive, and this perception was to him so natural and self -evident that he saw no need
to argue it.
The market – more or less unf ettered – was the natural equivalent in economic terms of  polit ical
democracy, achieving the same dispersal of  economic power throughout society as democracy achieved in
polit ical terms. He saw no need f or democracy to act as a restraint on the economic outcomes determined
by the market, and he saw no danger that the “f ree market” might in some ways prove inimical to ef f ective
democracy.
That conf idence was helped greatly in the last two decades of  the twentieth century by what appeared to
be a conclusive resolution of  a contentious debate within western countries and economies themselves
about the f orm that a market economy should properly take.
But by the 1970s, a real debate had opened up, so that the received wisdom of  the immediate post-war
years was subject to new challenge. New ideas began to surf ace; the individual, rather than society, was
seen as the pivotal point of  human endeavour and progress; writers like Hayek and Nozick questioned the
need f or or appropriateness of  an extended role f or government or the acceptability of  meddling in “f ree”
market solutions; redistributive taxation, the provision of  taxpayer- f unded benef its to the disadvantaged,
and the power of  organised labour came to be seen as obstacles to economic growth rather than as
guarantees of  an equitable distribution of  wealth; economists like Milton Friedman questioned the ef f icacy
in peacetime of  Keynesian intervention and promoted the idea that macro-economic policy was really just a
simple matter of  controlling the money supply in order to restrain inf lation; while global developments such
as the oil-price shock of  the early 1970s meant that inf lation rather than f ull employment was seen as the
primary issue f or economic policy.
What had been regarded as the “post-war consensus” had begun, in other words, to unravel. That process
was helped along – especially in the United Kingdom – by the awareness of  what seemed to be an
increasingly dif f icult economic conundrum; how was the welf are state to be maintained in the f ace of  the
pressing need to improve competit iveness and productivity so as to meet the challenges of  newly ef f icient
rivals? In the late 1970s, “stagf lation” – the f ailure to secure an acceptable rate of  growth, combined with
the threat that even if  a f aster rate of  growth could be achieved, it could be only at the cost of  higher
inf lation, was seen to present (in the absence of  any disposit ion to use the exchange rate to improve
competit iveness) an impassable brick wall and dead end.
By the 1980s, many of  these issues had been resolved in f avour of  the “f ree market” ref ormers. Many of
their ideas had been carried into government by Ronald Reagan and Margaret. The two leaders made
common cause at the beginning of  the penultimate decade of  the century in taking a step whose
signif icance perhaps even they did not f ully grasp at the time. The portentous decision was taken in the US
and UK to f loat their currencies and to remove exchange controls. The way was now clear not only f or an
explosion in international trade and f oreign investment, but f or a determined assault by international capital
on the polit ical power of  democratically elected governments across the globe.
The ability to move capital at will across national boundaries not only meant that international investors
could bypass national governments but also enabled them to threaten such governments that they would
lose essential investment if  they did not comply with the investors’ demands. This shif ted the balance of
power dramatically back in the direction of  capital, and set the seal on the triumph of  those “f ree-market”
principles of  economic policy that became known as the “Washington consensus”.
“History”, in other words, had continued to unf old. Our civilisation has been transf ormed by the triumph of
the “f ree-market” ideology. Western liberalism, which had inf ormed, supported and extended human
progress f or perhaps 700 years, has now been supplanted by an aggressive self - interested doctrine of  the
individual which leaves no room f or community and cooperation. Even the victims of  this comprehensive
and f undamental change seem hardly aware of  what has happened.
Fukuyama f ailed to recognise that the threat to western democracy came f rom within those democracies
themselves. It came f rom the greed and self - interest of  the rich and powerf ul, but also f rom the quiescence
and apathy of  that much greater number who f orgot what democracy meant and the value that it delivered
to them and who are lef t conf used and puzzled as to what has gone wrong. We have instead allowed the
substance to be sucked out, so that only the shell, the f orms, of  democracy remain. The West has lost its
way because we have not cherished and made a reality of  the democracy that was our most valuable
protection and greatest achievement.
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